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Abstract – The U.S. Department of Energy, through its agents the Next Generation Nuclear Plant
Project and the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative, is working on developing the technologies to enable
the large scale production of hydrogen using nuclear power. A very important consideration in the
design of a co-located and connected nuclear plant/hydrogen plant facility is safety. This study
provides an overview of the safety issues associated with a combined plant and discusses
approaches for categorizing, quantifying, and addressing the safety risks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is
actively pursuing the development of advanced
nuclear reactors that will provide greater efficiencies,
stronger proliferation resistance, lower capital costs,
and greater sustainability than today’s generation of
operating commercial reactors. These advanced
reactor concepts are known as “Generation IV” [1].
One of the Generation IV concepts is the Very High
Temperature Reactor (VHTR), a gas-cooled thermal
fission reactor that will be capable of providing large
quantities of high-temperature thermal energy
(greater than 1173 K) for use in the production of
hydrogen or other industrial applications. In 2005,
the U.S. Energy Policy Act [2] authorized the
creation of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant
(NGNP) Project and named the Idaho National
Laboratory (INL) to lead the multi-laboratory effort
to develop a Generation IV nuclear reactor facility
that would be capable of generating electricity,
hydrogen, or both, on a large scale. The NGNP
Project is focused on the development of the VHTR
and is working closely with another DOE program,
the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative (NHI), to develop
advanced hydrogen production methods (e.g., S-I
Process [3], High-Temperature Electrolysis [4], etc.)
that can utilize the high-temperature thermal energy
produced by the VHTR to produce efficiently
hydrogen from the splitting of water.
The NGNP is envisioned as a co-located nuclear
plant/hydrogen plant facility (Fig 1).
Fig. 1. Schematic of NGNP Facility
In the NGNP, the high temperature thermal energy
produced by the nuclear reactor is transmitted to the
hydrogen production plant through an intermediate
heat exchanger (IHX), a heat transfer loop, and at
least one process heat exchanger (PHX) [5].
Technically, the challenges of creating such a
system are many, and much research thus far has
been on the development of enabling technologies
including materials identification and property
measurements, component design, measurement of
physical data to fill knowledge gaps, and the
development and testing of integrated system models.
The results of this research have been
encouraging, and the development discussions are
evolving from examining questions of the type ‘Can
it be done?’ to the type ‘Can it be done safely,
efficiently, and at acceptable cost?’. Safety is of
utmost importance in the co-location of a nuclear
plant and a hydrogen plant, and a strong safety case
will be needed to support eventual U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing of the
NGNP facility, as required in the U.S. Energy Policy
Act. Though commercial nuclear plants have been
constructed in the general region of chemical plants,
no large-scale chemical plant is co-located and
directly connected to a nuclear reactor. A premise of
the NGNP Project and the NHI is that co-location and
connection of a nuclear plant with a chemical plant,
specifically a VHTR and a hydrogen production
facility, can be done safely and in a manner
acceptable to the NRC.
This article describes safety concerns related to
the co-location and combined operation of a nuclear
plant and a hydrogen production plant, strategies for
quantifying the risks, and possible approaches for
mitigating the risks through engineering and
operational controls (defense-in-depth). It is the
incremental risk associated with the hydrogen plant
that is of interest here rather than the risks associated
with the nuclear reactor itself, as it is assumed that
the general nuclear engineering community already
understands such risks. As with any complex
engineering system, the application of safety controls
to the NGNP must be balanced by their impacts on
plant functionality and economics. After achieving
the required level of safety, the application of
additional controls must be balanced and not so
onerous as to make the whole project uneconomical.
Recommendations are provided for future work.
II. SAFETY CONCERNS
In categorizing safety concerns for a co-located
nuclear plant/hydrogen plant facility such as the
NGNP, there is a spectrum of adverse events that can
occur externally to the nuclear plant. For
convenience, three tiers of events are postulated:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary events are
here defined as accidents or equipment failures at the
hydrogen plant or the intermediate heat transfer loop
that lead to nuclear reactor core damage and the
significant release of radioactive materials from the
nuclear reactor into the environment. Such an event
would be an extraordinary failure of controls and
would have far- reaching effects on near-by
communities and to the nuclear power industry in
general. Secondary events concern failures that
result in crippling damage to equipment, leaks of
regulated chemicals into the environment, and that
may lead to injury to human operators. The third tier
of events involves impacts to normal operation
caused by unscheduled plant occurrences (e.g.,
unplanned shutdowns, minor equipment failures, etc.)
and events that have adverse economic impacts on
combined plant operations but do not cause physical
damage to the plant or harm to personnel. While less
of a safety issue than an operational issue, deviation
from normal operating conditions can create
conditions that may lead to human error or may
shorten the usable lifetime of equipment, and this in
turn may create conditions for a higher tier event.
Of these three tiers, the NRC is most concerned
with first tier events. The NRC’s primary mission [6]
is to “...protect public health and safety and the
environment from the effects of radiation from
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities....”
Installation of a co-located and connected hydrogen
production plant is a perturbation on the established
nuclear power generation model, and so the
incremental risk imposed by the hydrogen production
plant must be carefully determined to support an
NRC license application. In the end, the NRC must
be convinced that the co-location and connection of a
hydrogen production facility to a VHTR poses no
statistically significant increased hazard to the
nuclear plant. Therefore, characterization of the
causes and impacts of phenomena leading to nuclear
reactor damage by phenomena external to the nuclear
reactor must take precedence in all safety analyses of
the combined facility.
Prevention of a first tier event is a necessary but
not sufficient condition in establishing the safety and
design features of the NGNP. The success of the
NGNP will depend on preventing and mitigating
second and third tier events too. Since the NGNP
concept involves a non-nuclear hydrogen production
plant, other regulatory bodies such as the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) will impose rules and standards to ensure
safe operation of the hydrogen plant and, more
broadly, to prevent second tier events. The meaning
and impact of such rules and standards must be
understood and incorporated into plant designs and
operations. Lastly, the NGNP designers and
operators will be responsible for their own benefit for
building and operating a combined facility that is
reliable, inspectable, easily repaired, and predictable,
so that the frequency of third tier events is
minimized.
The broad classes of safety events may be caused
by predecessor events. Some predecessor events are:
• Seismic activity
• H2 explosions
• Chemical fires (H2, O2, and other
reactive materials)
• Chemical releases (gas and liquid)
• Equipment degradation and malfunction
• Human error
A greater understanding of the frequencies, effects,
and mitigating or preventive measures for such
predecessor events may be gained by employing a
variety of tools and approaches.
III. APPROACHES
The most useful tools and approaches for
understanding and affecting the incremental risk
related to the hydrogen plant are quantitative risk
analysis, plant modeling and simulation, data
collection and analysis, hydrogen plant architectural
analysis, and efforts related to continuous
improvement. These are explained below.
III.A. Quantitative Risk Analysis
Quantitative risk analysis (also called
probabilistic risk assessment or probabilistic safety
analysis) is a process of developing and
understanding numerical estimates of risk [7].
Historical experience, analytical methods, and
acquired knowledge and intuition form the
foundation of quantitative risk analyses (QRAs), and
QRA tools are used to help answer the questions
“How likely is it?”, “What can go wrong?”, and
“What are the impacts?” when examining possible
safety-related occurrences. In QRA, possible hazards
are first identified, and then are analyzed for
frequency and impact. The relationships between
individual occurrences (e.g., failure of a pump,
operator error) and overall impacts of those
occurrences (e.g., hydrogen leak) can be complex,
and the probabilities and consequences of individual
occurrences and must be assessed collectively to
arrive at an overall understanding of risk.
Though the chemical process industry has
traditionally relied on shared experience and
deterministic models to assess risk in chemical
plants, the incremental risk of combining a hydrogen
production plant with a nuclear plant is less
understood, and there is no historical precedent.
QRA will be needed to assess the risks, and the NRC
will expect to see a QRA of the combined facility
when it is reviewing the license application of the
NGNP [8].
Some initial work in this area was an evaluation
of the minimum separation distance between the
nuclear plant and the hydrogen plant [9]. From an
engineering standpoint, the separation distance must
be minimized to reduce thermal losses and to reduce
the costs of the intermediate heat transfer loop, but
the distance cannot be so small as to jeopardize the
nuclear plant in the event of an accident at the
hydrogen production plant. The events analyzed in
this study were hydrogen explosions and the release
of chemical clouds from a co-located Sulfur-Iodine
hydrogen production plant. The goal of the study
was to determine the minimum distance needed
between the nuclear plant and hydrogen plant such
that the incremental probability of causing nuclear
core damage due to hydrogen explosion or a
chemical release was no greater than 1.0E-6
events/year. The separation distance between the
two plants is shown graphically in Figure 2. Event
and fault trees were developed and analyzed using
SAPHIRE [10]. The effects of hydrogen explosions
were analyzed using an INL hydrogen explosion code
[11], and chemical dispersions were modeled using
ALOHA [12].
Fig. 2. A representation of the NGNP showing
separation distance
The conclusions from this study were that a
minimum separation distance of 110 m was needed
between the nuclear plant and the hydrogen plant in
the default configuration (shown in Figure 2) for
hydrogen explosions involving up to 100 kg H2.
Determination of the minimum separation distance
was chiefly a function of the blast effects of hydrogen
explosions and was not significantly affected by
chemical dispersion events. It was found that the
separation distance could be reduced to as low as 60
m if blast deflection barriers or an earthen wall are
placed between the two plants, or if the nuclear plant
is placed below grade.
Developing the QRA for the NGNP should be an
organizing principle around which safety-related
information is collected and organized, and specific
system designs are evaluated. As the QRA
information is established, gaps in the supporting
data will be identified and research needs will be
refined. Assumptions will be defined explicitly and
checked against the data collected. Plant models and
designs will be constructed and analyzed in detail,
and the information collected from preliminary
QRAs will help developers understand which design
changes may bear the most fruit in regards to risk
reduction. In addition to the addressing the primary
concern of how the hydrogen plant might affect the
nuclear plant, QRA can be used to assess the risks of
individual sub-systems within the hydrogen plant, or
even to assess the risks associated with particular
operational schedules and set points.
Figure 3. A flow sheet representation of H2SO4 section.
It must be understood that QRA is an evaluation
tool and is not a design tool; that is, QRA can be used
to evaluate given designs, but QRA will not provide
the “right” design. The evaluated risks must be
compared to the acceptable levels of risk, which is
defined external to the QRA, and it will be the
interplay between calculated risks, design
configurations, costs, and acceptable risk that will
provide the optimal design.
III.B. Plant Modeling and Simulation
As a foundation for developing a QRA for the
NGNP, detailed plant models must be constructed for
the combined facility so that the expected behaviors
of individual systems and the integrated plant are
understood. This modeling will involve analysis of
steady-state and unsteady-state operations.
Studies of steady-state plant operations, at least
of the hydrogen production plant, must start with the
process flow sheet. An example of a process flow
sheet for a section of the S-I Hydrogen Production
Process [13] is shown in Figure 3. The flow sheet
defines the mass and energy flows, temperatures,
pressures, chemical compositions, and
chemical/physical changes that occur in individual
flow streams and process components at steady-state
or time-invariant conditions. The flow sheet usually
consists of a graphical representation, as shown
above, and sets of tables, which provide detailed
information on each process stream and component.
Flow sheets can be generated manually, but are
usually developed using commercial software
packages such as Aspen Plus™.
Once the energy and mass flows are understood
using detailed flow sheets, unsteady-state models
must be developed also to understand the phenomena
that may occur during start-up, shutdown, and off-
normal events. Unsteady-state models are also
important for developing and assessing the
effectiveness of plant process control strategies.
Supporting data for the development of unsteady-
state models includes the calculation or measurement
of individual time constants, heat and mass transfer
information, chemical kinetics data and other time-
variant data.
III.C. Data Collection and Analysis
The steady state and unsteady-state models will
provide information on the expected performance of
the plant, but this information must be compared to
actual experience and measured data to at least verify
the veracity of the models. During process
development, it is very likely that there will be
insufficient data to construct accurate models, and
laboratory data will be needed to define or narrow the
uncertainty bounds on certain process parameters,
such as the performance of select catalysts or
chemical separation processes
The flow sheets and unsteady-state models are
abstractions of real processes, and data must be
obtained on the real materials of construction and the
performance of actual components. Such data is not
only used to build real processes that resemble the
models, but also to understand when models may
deviate from actual performance, and, in the extreme,
to understand how real components, systems, and
processes can fail. Since the NGNP will be operating
at high temperatures, pressures, and under difficult
chemical conditions, it is especially important to
choose the right materials of construction and to
understand the effects of creep, cracking, erosion,
and corrosion on the reliability of materials and
components. Such information can be collected from
materials studies, single component tests, integrated
lab-scale tests, and pilot-scale plants. In such tests it
is as important to define where the materials and
components cannot survive as it is to determine how
well the materials and components perform within
the defined operating envelopes. Such information
would be directly applicable to constructing the
QRA.
Instead of relying solely on self-generated data,
industrial information sources should be utilized to
gather as much information as possible on component
reliability, accident scenarios, and industry best
practices in regard to plant design and the use of
safety and control systems. Though efforts have
been made to develop all-inclusive chemical plant
accident databases [14], it is perhaps best to consult
experts and to recover data that is specific to the
chemical industries that are most relevant to
hydrogen production, namely those currently
involved in hydrogen and oxygen production, and
those who produce the corrosive chemicals involved
in some of the proposed hydrogen production
processes (e.g., H2SO4, HI, I2).
III.D. Hydrogen Plant Architecture
Another design factor that will receive more
attention in NGNP design than is usually considered
during chemical plant development is plant
architecture. In isolation, the hydrogen plant
components would likely be arranged to optimize
energy conservation and to minimize the length of
flow paths. The directional orientation of the plant
may be determined by the size of the plant
boundaries, the geography of the plant site, and the
proximity to roads, rail lines, and pipelines for raw
material and product delivery. The placement of
certain process units within the plant boundary may
be influenced somewhat by accident scenarios (e.g.,
avoiding the mixing of incompatible chemicals in the
event of a spill), but the overall placement of units
will usually have many degrees of freedom.
Co-location and connection of a hydrogen
production with a nuclear facility imposes very
strong directional considerations, and the relative risk
of the various possible hydrogen plant configurations
is highly anisotropic. In regard to thermal energy
transfer, the highest temperature sections of the
hydrogen production plants must be placed as close
to the nuclear reactor as possible. The hydrogen
production components and hydrogen storage vessels
must be placed as far away from the nuclear plant as
possible. In the S-I Process, for instance, the highest
temperature section (H2SO4 decomposition) is
separated from the hydrogen production section (the
HI decomposition), and such a separation is possible.
In the case of High Temperature Electrolysis, the
highest temperature component of the process is the
hydrogen production unit, and so the inventory of
hydrogen in the hydrogen production cells must be
minimized by the removal of hydrogen as quickly it
is produced, imposing additional constraints on the
plant architecture.
To determine plant architectures, component
sizes and connections must be determined using the
flow sheet data, and then examined. Computer-
aided design tools such as Autocad
®
would be useful
at this stage of development. Then, the effects of
proximity, plant geometry, chemical inventories, and
so forth can be evaluated using other modeling tools
to support development and revision of the QRA.
III.E. Continuous Improvement
Once the combined facility is operational, a
number of practices can be employed to continue to
reduce the incremental risk of operating the facility.
Some practices are described below.
The QRA, once established, can be updated and
revised as changes occur in materials, equipment
design, component configurations, and plant
operating conditions. By doing so, the potential
safety or operational risk impacts of suggested
process or plant improvements could be assessed on
an equal basis with the current state of the plant.
Such an analysis is especially helpful in determining
whether a process or equipment change might not
have unintended effects on locations removed from
the point of interest.
Statistical process control techniques may be
used to track the performance of individual processes
over time and to spot long-term trends in
performance that may not always be visible over
short time scales.
A protocol of equipment inspections and
surveillance can be established to monitor the effects
of corrosion, fatigue, and other materials failure
mechanisms on the integrity of process vessels. Such
inspections are especially critical for process units
that are exposed to highly corrosive and/or high-
temperature environments. A combination of field
data and laboratory materials data might be used to
assess the useful remaining lifetime of process
equipment, and select equipment can be replaced at
regular intervals if necessary to protect against more
costly failures in the future.
Lastly, an integrated plant safety philosophy
such as the INL’s Integrated Safety Management
System [15] might be adopted to reinforce safe plant
operations and to seek continuous improvement. At
the INL, the guiding principles of the Integrated
Safety Management System are:
• Line management responsibility for safety
• Clear roles and responsibilities
• Competence commensurate with
responsibilities
• Balanced priorities
• Identification of safety standards and
requirements




Its objective is to “incorporate safety into
management and work practices at all levels,
addressing all types of work and all types of hazards
to ensure the safety of the workers, the public and the
environment.” An integrated safety approach is
needed because analyses, models, and inspections
alone are insufficient to ensure safe plant operation.
The risk of human error in plant operation cannot be
eliminated, but its effects might be reduced through
careful management of work procedures and
operations, and the collection, assessment and
sharing of accident and “near-miss” incident data.
While the INL’s Integrated Safety Management
System has been developed for specific application to
the INL, its general goal of achieving continuous
improvement in plant safety is applicable to any plant
environment.
IV. NGNP PATH FORWARD
The NGNP is at a preliminary stage of
development. Research and development work is
taking place on individual components and enabling
technologies, but the shape and configuration of the
larger integrated system is still mostly undefined. In
parallel with the system-specific development
activities, work must begin on developing the
detailed QRA, and this in turn will help define the
needs for specific data from the laboratory and from
steady-state and unsteady-state plant models. The
goal at this stage is not to produce a fully detailed
QRA but to determine what information is needed to
support the QRA, so that budgets, schedules, and
work scope can be more fully defined.
Research scope needs to be expanded to study
second-tier events. The initial QRA study of plant
separation distance [9] considered a first-tier event –
damage to the nuclear core due to hydrogen
explosion or chemical leak. Most other research and
development work is being done to enable the plant
to operate according to expectations, or, in other
words, to prevent the plant from suffering third tier
events. Studies have not yet been done to examine
how things might fail, and this will need to be done
to provide information for the integrated NGNP
QRA.
V. SUMMARY
The NGNP is a Generation IV concept involving
the co-location and connection of a VHTR with a
hydrogen production plant. There is no commercial
precedent for such a system, and extensive safety
analyses will be needed to achieve the desired level
of safety and risk. Recommendations of approaches
to characterize and achieve safety and operational
goals were provided including QRA, plant modeling
and simulation, data collection and analysis, analyses
of hydrogen plant architecture, and continuous
improvement. The NGNP is at the start of the
development process, and it is suggested that QRA be
the organizing tool around which future safety-
related research is performed.
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